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"The degree of necessity is to be determined rather
by the permanency, apparent purpose, and adaptibility of the disposition made by the owner during the
unity of title, than by considering whether a possible
use can be made of the parcel granted, after a discontinuance of the right formerly exercised over the
other.2"
"The reasonable application of the doctrine as we
deduce it from the authorities, however, leads to the
general conclusion that if the service imposed on one,
during the unity of possession of the parcels of land,
was of a character looking to permanency, and the
discontinuance of such service would obviously invoke an actual and substantial rearrangement of that
part of the estate in whose favor the service was imposed, to the end that it might be as comfortably enjoyed as before then such a degree of reasonable
necessity would seem to exist as would raise
an impli21
cation that the use was to be continued.
It would seem that "reasonable necessity" and "strict
necessity" are accurate and proper terms for describing
what motivates courts in allowing or disallowing easements
by implication.

SPECIFIC RESTITUTION IN EQUITY OF
CONVERTED STOCKS AND BONDS
Farmer v. O'Carroll1
At the time of the transaction in question the plaintiffappellant was a widow of about 63 years with an estate of
about $180,000. She delivered to defendants-appellees, the
treasurer of a college and the college corporation, $135,350
worth of Liberty Bonds and signed a written agreement to
the effect that the bonds were an absolute gift by her to
the college corporation, but that the corporation was to
pay the plaintiff the interest received from the bonds until
"0John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582,
2 N.
E. 188, 192 (1885).
21
Ibid., 2 N. E.

193.

1 162 Md. 431, 160 A. 12 (1932).
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her death. Later, more of such bonds ($20,000 worth)
were delivered by the plaintiff to the treasurer for the corporation, presumably under the same terms, but no written
agreement was made therefor. The plaintiff later brought
a bill in equity against the college corporation and its
treasurer alleging that she had been told by the treasurer
that she could get the bonds back upon demand, that she
had been induced to sign the written agreement by the
fraud and misrepresentations of the treasurer, that the defendants had been her trusted and confidential advisers,
that the defendants had concealed from her the true contents of the agreement by undue influence, and that the
defendants had refused to return the bonds upon demand.
She prayed an accounting, rescission of the written agreement, and a decree ordering the defendants to return the
bonds. The defendants' demurrer to the bill was sustained,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The ground for sustaining the demurrer was misjoinder of causes of action. The two gifts of bonds were
treated separately by the Court.
Concerning the first group ($135,350) of bonds, the
Court held that the plaintiff stated a good cause of action
in her prayer for rescission of the written agreement on
grounds of fraud and undue influence, the college corporation being liable on the basis of apparent authority for
the misrepresentations of its agent, the treasurer. Fraud
is a matter peculiar to equity.
However, the Court put the smaller gift ($20,000) on a
different footing. The facts as alleged were held to constitute a bailment by the plaintiff and a conversion by the
defendants. Such a conversion gave the plaintiff a right
of action at law for the tort or for breach of the contract
of bailment, and equity should not take jurisdiction. Thus
the Court held that the complaint joined a matter for
which there was a legal remedy with a matter peculiar to
equity jurisdiction and affirmed the sustaining of the defendants' demurrer.
This discussion will be limited to that portion of the
case in which an equity Court refused to take jurisdiction
to decree the specific return of converted bonds. Causes
involving the specific return of chattels are included in
that group over which courts of law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction. That is, while the primary right,
estate or interest of the complaining party is one created
by and cognizable by the law, equity will exercise its juris-
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diction occasionally to enforce such rights; and that only
when the remedy at law is inadequate.2
Professor Pomeroy submits that to speak of the inadequacy of the remedy at law is inaccurate.3 It is not that
the remedy itself is inadequate, for substantially the same
remedy is given in equity, but it is the inability of the law
courts to apply the remedy to its fullest extent in a proper
case. This impotency on the part of the law courts is
caused by the want of elasticity and adaptability to special
circumstances of modes of legal procedure. However,
whether the inadequacy be implicit in the remedy or in
the application of the remedy, the courts have been uniform
as to the general meaning of the formula.
To use as an example the subject now under discussion,
the specific recovery of chattels, it seems to be well settled
that equity will not, in general, decree the specific return
of chattels.4 The reason given is that their money value
recovered as damages at law will enable the complaining
party to replace his chattels from the market. The remedy
at law is adequate, since it puts the plaintiff back into the
position he enjoyed before being wronged by the defendant.
But there may be certain chattels which by their nature
can neither be specifically recovered at law, nor will damages enable the plaintiff to replace his chattels from the
market. Two classes of cases may be listed here: (1)
those involving articles of special value to their owners
but of no general pecuniary value, and (2) those involving
articles having a general pecuniary value but the actual
cash value of which in a given case is incapable of accurate
determination. The particular kind of chattels in which we
are principally interested in this discussion, namely stocks
and bonds are generally regarded as falling within the
second class since by virtue of their constantly fluctuating
value, damages cannot be estimated with sufficient accuracy to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he was before.
However, there is some authority for a contrary view
refusing to decree the specific return of stocks and bonds,
2 McGrath v. C. T. Sherer Co., 291 Mass. 35, 195 N. E. 913 (1935);
Mayer v. Collins, 263 Iil. App. 219 (1931) ; Peoples Pittsburgh Trust Co. v.
Saupp, 320 Pa. 138, 182 A. 376 (1936) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Yamasaki, 159 Ore. 123, 78 Pac. (2) 570 (1938) ; Brex v. Smith, 104 N. J. Eq.
386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918), Sec. 173.
Burr v. Bloomsburg, 101 N. J. Eq. 615, 138 A. 876 (1927) ; McKlttrlck
v. Bates, 47 R. I. 240, 132 A. 610 (1926); Hughes Trust & Banking Co. v.
Consolidated Title Co., 81 Fla. 568, 88 So. 266 (1921).
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unless they have some special value apart from their
market value or unless there are special equities.' In
other words, these jurisdictions treat stocks and bonds like
any other chattels and refuse to regard them as exceptions
to the general rule.
Prior Maryland cases in this regard seemed to follow
along a well marked path, but the case here being discussed
gives indication of a possible trend in another direction.
The first case in Maryland to discuss this problem at any
great length was Scarborough v. Scotten.6 The plaintiff
there had indorsed some bills and notes to the defendant's
testator, the latter orally agreeing to collect said bills and
notes and to deliver the proceeds to the plaintiff's wife.
The defendant's testator failed to make any collections
during his lifetime, and, upon his death, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant return the bills and notes.
Upon the defendant's refusal to do so, the plaintiff brought
his bill in equity praying a specific return of the bills and
notes. It was contended'by the defendant on demurrer
that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction because
the remedy at law was adequate. The defendant's demurrer was sustained below, but the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the remedy at law was inadequate
and that the lower court should have exercised its jurisdiction. The Court said: "There can be no doubt that the
true ground of interference by a Court of equity, is the inadequacy of the legal remedy to give full relief. That is
the test."7 In determining that the remedy at law in this
case was inadequate, the Court pointed out that the nature
of the chattels themselves was such as to cause deficiencies
in the available legal remedies. Replevin would give no
relief because the defendant could file a retorno habendo
bond rather than deliver the bills and notes to the sheriff
(in which case plaintiff might be remitted to an action on
the bond for damages). Nor would trover give any adequate relief, since damages in such an action are computed
8
as of the time of the conversion (citing Hepburn v. Sewell
and Herzberg v. Adams'), and the value of the bills and
notes fluctuates with the solvency of the many persons liable
thereon. Thus, while the plaintiff could undoubtedly get
121 C. J. 62; Friedman v. Fraser, 157 Ala. 191, 47 So. 320 (1908);
Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis et al., 190 Pa. 544, 42 A. 1022 (1899) ; Hill v.
Rockingham Bank, 44 N. H. 567 (1863).
0 69 Md. 137, 14 A. 704 (1888).
7
Ibid, 69 Md. 137, 140, 14 A. 704, 705.
85 H. & J. 211 (Md. 1821).
939 Md. 309 (1874).
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some relief at law, the Court felt that the chattels concerned were of such a nature that the legal remedy would
not be sufficient to meet the "full relief" test quoted.
The same point was raised on demurrer to the bill in
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Coyle,"0 involving converted
stocks and bonds, and the Court quoted at great length
from the Scarboroughcase, reiterating the arguments there
presented. In Lipson v. Evans," involving corporate
stocks, the Court of Appeals decided the jurisdiction question in complete accord with the Scarboroughcase and the
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. case, citing both these cases with
approval.
In McIntyre v. Smith12 the same point was again raised
on demurrer to the bill. Decedent had retired from business and handed over to the defendants, his children, large
amounts of Liberty Loan Bonds, Federal Land Bank bonds,
and bonds of a few foreign governments to be held until
his death. Upon his death, the defendants refused to return to the administrator of the estate such of the bonds
as were negotiable by delivery alone, so the administrator
brought a bill in equity for the specific return of the bonds.
The Court granted the relief prayed. The plaintiff (the
administrator) had alleged that decedent had delivered the
bonds to the defendants in trust as his confidential agents
and custodians, so that the Court had two possible grounds
on which to base its jurisdiction: (1) The inadequacy of
the plaintiff's remedy at law, and (2) the plaintiff's allegation that the property was held under a constructive trust.
The Court seemed to feel that there was no doubt but that
the Scarborough case and Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Coyle
expressed the true state of Maryland law on this subject
at that time. It discussed both those cases in detail, both
as to facts and holdings, strongly approved of the views
expressed therein, and held that they were applicable to
the bonds involved. It then went on to hold that there
was no trust to be enforced and thus based its decision
entirely on the inadequacy of the remedy at law.
Thus it would appear that up to 1928, at least, it was
well settled in Maryland that wrongfully withheld stocks
and bonds could be specifically restored in equity. No
special equities were needed, it being considered that the
remedies available at law for their conversion fall short of
giving adequate relief.
10 133 Md. 343, 105 A. 308 (1918).
11133 Md. 370, 105 A. 312 (1918).
12 154 Md. 660, 141 A. 405 (1928).
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In the case now under discussion, precisely the same
point seems to have been involved as in the earlier cases,
namely whether a court of equity should exercise its jurisdiction to decree the specific return of converted bonds.
The opinion of the Court made the flat statement that the
plaintiff had a remedy at law and therefore equity would
not have jurisdiction. No inquiry was made into the adequacy of the legal remedy, and the point was briefly dismissed as though the Court felt that there was little or no
room for argument. The cases cited in support by the
Court do not seem particularly in point. 3 They merely
hold that a bailor has a cause of action at law against his
bailee for conversion of bailed chattels. The Court did not
mention at all the cases, discussed above, holding the legal
remedy inadequate where the chattels converted are
stocks, bonds or other evidences of indebtedness.
It is submitted that the decision in Farmer v. O'Carroll
can be supported on two grounds. First, just a few months
earlier, Fisher v. Dinneen 4 was decided adopting the New
York rule 5 as to the measure of damages for the conversion
of stocks and bonds, namely the highest value between the
time of the conversion and a reasonable time thereafter.
This change in the measure of damages for conversion
would answer the argument on that ground as advanced in
Scarboroughv. Scotten 16 and the cases following it. However, Fisher v. Dinneen was not mentioned in the opinion
*in Farmer v. O'Carroll.7
The second ground supporting the result in Farmer v.
O'Carroll involves disagreement with the reasoning used
in the earlier Maryland cases. They relied heavily on the
argument that the remedy at law was inadequate because
damages would not make the plaintiff whole again, i. e.
because of difficulties in computation resulting from the
fluctuating solvency of those obligated on the bills and
notes involved. But, stocks and bonds are frequently as
readily replaceable on the open market as other chattels,
there usually being no doubt as to the solvency of the obligor. It becomes a question of fact for each case as to
13 Maury and Osbourn v. Coyle, 34 Md. 235 (1871) ; Third National Bank
v. Boyd, 44 Md. 47 (1876) ; Pessagno v. Salabes, 159 Md. 476, 150 A. 866
(1930) ; 6 0. J. 1152-4.
14 161 Md. 605, 158 A. 9 (1932).
15 Mayer et al. v. Monzo, 221 N. Y. 442, 117 N. E. 948 (1917) ; and see
Wachtell, The Measure of DaWges on Cowver8ion of Securities (1934)
12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 240-245.
' 8 Supra, notes 6, 7, 8 and 9.
, As indicated earlier Farmer v. O'Carroll merely stated that the legal
remedy was adequate, without any explanation for this conclusion.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. IV

whether or not damages will make the plaintiff whole
again. Accordingly, little justification can be seen for making stocks, bonds, and other evidences of indebtedness a
separate class of chattels.
It is submitted that the Court should conform to the
general rule as to the specific recovery of chattels, as was
done in Farmerv. O'Carroll,and refuse to grant relief, unless some special circumstances are shown making the legal
remedy inadequate. It is regrettable, however, that the
earlier cases establishing a different rule should not have
been mentioned and definitely overruled. The silence of
the Court in this respect leaves the present status of these
cases, as well as the applicable rule as to equitable jurisdiction, in considerable doubt.

WHAT DETERMINES DOMICIL
Gaver v. County Commissioners For Frederick County.
In the Matter of Charles Delmar'
This is an appeal taken by the Supervisor of Assessments for Frederick County to the State Tax Commission
from the failure of the County Commissioners for that
county to assess the intangible property tax on some $300,
000 of securities for the years 1936, 1937 and 1938, reported
as being owned by Charles Delmar, a registered voter of
Frederick County. There was no written record of the
proceedings and the Tax Commission assumed that the
County Commissioners refused to enter an assessment on
the basis that Mr. Delmar was not a resident of Frederick
County.
The undisputed evidence showed that Charles Delmar
was born in New York. For many years prior to 1924 he
was a resident of Maryland, but in that year he left the
State and resided in New York until 1927 when he moved
to Washington, D. C. In 1931 Mr. Delmar married and
afterward resided in a home in Washington, which was
reputed to be worth much more than the assessed value
of $62,000. Mr. Delmar maintained offices in Washington
and was the principal owner of eight or nine financial enterprises. The home telephone was listed in Mrs. Delmar's name. Three automobiles were licensed by the Dis1 Baltimore Daily Record, January 23, 1939 (Md. St. Tax Comm. 1939).

